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ABSTRACT
This paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically
induced business cycle in the U.S. in the post—World War II period. The
cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional
"political business cycle" of Nordhaus. It is based on a systematic
difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model
with labor contracts. From an explicit optimization problem we derive a
system of equations for output and money growth. Then we successfully
test the non-linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters
of the system of equations. We cannot reject the hypothesis that money
growth has been systematically different under the two types of
administration and that this difference contributes to explain output
fluctuations.
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1.Introduction
The most famous attempt to model the relationship between political
and economic cycles is the "political business cycle" theory formulated
by Nordhaus (1915) and McRae (1971). Three crucial assumptions underly
this approach: (i) the parties are "office motivated," in the sense
that they care only about winning the elections, as in Downs (1957);
(ii) voters are not forward—looking and have short memories, so that
they can be systematically fooled;1 and (iii) the economy is described
by an exploitable Phillips curve and the rational expectations critique
is not taken into account.
The results derived by Nordhaus on the basis of these assumptions
are well—known. The incumbent stimulates the economy and reduces
unemployment close to election time in order to increase Its chances of
reelection. At the beginning of the new term, the inflationary effects
of the pre-electoral expansion are eliminated with a recession. The
behavior of the two parties is identical, and a cycle results in
equilibrium.
The empirical evidence in support of the "political business cycle"
theory is rather weak for the U.S. ease; in fact this theory has been
rejected by several authors using post—Second World War U.S. data.
Given these rejections, an increasing number of empirical studies
have moved toward a "partisan theory" of macroeconomic policy. The
original proponent of this view was Hibbs (1917). This author argued
that the Democratic Party in the U.S. and socialist parties in Europe
have been more averse to unemployment and less averse to inflation than
the Republican party in the U.S. and conservative parties in Europe.This theory has been tested empirically by Hibbs and others, using
models based on an exploitable Phillips curve with no consideration for
the rational expectations critique.
In this paper a model closely related to that of Alesina (1985a) is
presented and tested on post—Second World War U.S. data. The model is
based on a "partisan view" of political parties but, contrary to
literature on the subject, it accounts for rational and forward—looking
expectations. In this model only "unexpected policy" matters; the
economy would exhibit policy neutrality features in a one-party system
with no elections. However, the elections create an important source of
uncertainty about the future: the economic agents do not know which
party will win the following election. If the relevant expectations
about monetary policy and inflation have to be formed before elections,
they are based on the averages of the policies that the two parties are
expected to follow once elected. If these policies are different the
elected party creates a surprise, in the sense that its policy was not
correctly predicted, since expectations accounted for the possibilityof
the election of the other party. The model, then, predicts that at the
beginning of the term in office of the more expansionary party one
should observe an output expansion above trend with high money growth.
Instead, when the less expansionary party is elected, a recession with
low money growth should be observed. There are no electoral surprises
in the second part of any administration; henoe, the model predicts
policy neutrality. Then, in the second part of both types of
administrations real variables should exhibit the same behavior
(ceteris paribus). However, it will be shown that even in the second5
part of the term in office the rate of money creation should be
different depending on the party in office.
Starting from an explicit maximization problem, we derive the
reaction functions of the two parties and their time consistent policies
and test the nonlinear restrictions on the parameters imposed by the
theory. This procedure makes it possible to estimate directly the
parameters of the objective functions of the two parties. The sample
used covers the nine completed administrations of the post—World War II
period, from President Truman through the first term of President
Reagan.
The data do not reject the assumption that there is a difference
between the objective functions of the two parties. The Democratic
administrations have been relatively more concerned about the output
target rather than the inflation/money creation target than the
Republican administrations. Furthermore, the empirical results do not
reject the hypothesis that systematic differences in output growth have
occurred in the first half of the administrations and not in the second,
in accordance with the theory. Thus, these results support a partisan
view of monetary policy (and in general of macropolicy) rather than a
political business cycle view. The only exception to this conclusion is
perhaps the first Nixon administration, the behavior of which is
probably better explained by a "political business cycle" view.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews some
of the recent empirical literature on the subject. Section 3 presents
the model and derives the empirical implications of it. Section 4
provides empirical evidence in accordance with the qualitative
implications of the model. In Section 5 the empirical estimates of the6
parameters of the model are presented and discussed. The concluding
section summarizes briefly the major findings and identifies several
open questions.
2. Political Business Cycle Theory and Partisan Theory
In his seminal article, Nordhaus (1975) provides suggestive
empirical evidence in favor of the "political business cycle" hypothesis
(henceforth PBC). This evidence appears favorable for the U.S. but
rather mixed for several other countries.2 In particular, Nordhaus
writes that the first Nixon administration is a "textbook example" of
PBC because of the inflationary expansion skillfully placed close to the
elections of 1972. However, the empirical work that has followed has
led to the conclusion that the first Nixon administration was probably
the only clear case of PBC in the post-Second World War period in the
U.S. NcCallum (1978), Golden—Foterba (1980), Beck (1982 and 19810,
Abrams—Froyen—Waud (1983), Hibbs (1977 and 1985), Chapell—Keech (1986),
and Havrileski (1985) all reject directly or indirectly the PBC
hypothesis. Hibbs (1985), for example, concludes that there is "no
persuasive evidence that presidential election years, viewed together,
generally have been occasions of unusual monetary and fiscal expansions
or of short run surges in output, real incomes, and employment." The
lack of strong empirical support for the PBC has led Alt—Chrystal (1983)
to conclude that "no one could read the political business cycle
literature without being struck by the lack of supportingevidence."3
On the other hand, Tufte (1978) finds some support for the PBC.
This author finds evidence of short run increases in transfers in7
electoral years. Hibbs (1985) confirms these findings, but nonetheless
they rail to provide convincing support for the general implications of
the PBC for the cycle of inflation and unemployment or output.
The lack of empirical support for the PBC has led to an increasing
amount of work directed toward testing a "partisan theory" (henceforth
PT) of macroeconomic policy and, in particular, of monetary policy.
This view was formulated in the seminal contribution of Hibbs (1977).
This author argued that leftist parties in Europe and the Democratic
party in the U.S. have been more likely to choose a point on the
Phillips curve with higher inflation and less unemployment than
conservative parties in Europe and the Republican party in the U.S.
Hibbs claims that the lower middle class and the working class benefit
from a policy of low unemployment and relatively high inflation and
these social groups tend to support the left. This view is clearly
summarized by Paul Samuelson, who wrote in 1977: "We tend to get our
recessions during Republican administrations.... The difference between
the Democrats and the Republicans is the difference in their
constituencies. It's a class difference ...theDemocrats constitute
the people, by and large, who are around the median incomes or below.
They are the ones whom the Republicans want to pay the price of fighting
inflation. The Democrats [are] willing to run with some inflation
the Republicans are not" (Samuelson (1977)). The events that followed
1977 hardly could have changed Samuelson's view of the subject. Very
similar views are expressed by Okun (1973), in disagreement with Stigler
(1973). Stein (1985) stresses that employment and growth were always
top priority for Democratic administrations after the Second World War,
while inflation was the first priority for Republican administrations.8
Kiewiet (1985) tests the hypothesis that voters in the U.S. did in fact
recognize the Democratic party as the one that tights unemployment and
the Republican party as the one that fights inflation. The author finds
that this hypothesis is supported by the empirical evidence.
Beck (19814) finds virtually no evidence in favor of the FBC and
concludes that monetary policy has been looser under Democratic
presidents than under Republican presidents; however, he finds that the
Kennedy and first Nixon administrations do not fit this pattern. On the
basis of these two exceptions he raises a word of caution with respect
to the PT as formulated by Hibbs. Beck claims that different
administrations of the same party have behaved differently; therefore,
"administrations" more than parties are what really count.
Nevertheless, despite this important consideration the PT is not
rejected by Beck's results. Furthermore, note that only the Nixon
exception is really problematic for the PT; this administration probably
behaved in a way more consistent with the FEC than with the PT.In the
case of the Kennedy administration the crucial fact is that the economy
was stimulated through fiscal rather than monetary expansion; this does
not imply that the FEC approach would fit the Kennedy administration
better than the PT.
Havrileski (1985) finds that changes of administrations from
Republican to Democratic have been asssociated with upward jumps in
money growth; conversely, downward jumps are observed when a Republican
administration is elected after a Democratic one.5
Chapell—Keech (1986) refer to results on unemployment that are
"quite similar in magnitude to those reported by Hibbs." The authors
also suggest that differences in the rates of unemployment under the9
administrations of the two parties tend to become smaller in the latter
part of the term. The explanation given for this phenomenon is very
similar to that suggested in this paper but the authors do not present
an explicit formalization of this problem.
Finally, note that systematically different monetary policies
between parties should imply a systematically different behavior of the
exchange rate. Preliminary results of Hansson (1985) show that since
the beginning of the floating regime, the U.S. dollar has shown a
tendency toward appreciation during Republican administrations and
toward depreciation during the Democratic administration of President
Carter.
Virtually all the empirical literature on policy choices on a
Phillips curve utilize models in which little attention, if any, is
devoted to incorporating rational expectations.6 The presumption of
many authors was that in models characterized by policy neutrality most
of the interest for the PT or for the PBC is lost. Secondly, almost no
attempt has been made to estimate the parameters of the policymakers'
objective functions. In fact, an explicit maximization problem of
parties' objective functions generally is not solved in order to derive
testable reduced forms.7 The model presented in the next section
incorporates both features: rational, forward—looking agents and an
explicit solution of the policymakers' maximization problem.
3. The Model
There are two parties, denoted with obvious reference party D and
party R. The two parties assign different weights to two policy10
targets: an inflation rate or money growth target and an output growth
target. The policy instrument controlled by the policymaker is therate
of money creation. A quadratic specification for the objective
functions of the two parties is adopted so that the loss function of the
two parties can be written as (the superscripts characterize the party):
zD t [(m
-(t)]2+(yt
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where m =rateof money growth; y =rateof growth of GNP; a, 5, c, •,
andaarenon—negative parameters; and q is the discount factor,
positive but less than one.
The economy is described by the following equation for output
growth:
y(t) +Y(mt
—
Equation(3) incorporates the basic properties of a Lucas supply
function in which only unexpected nominal shocks affect real variables.
In (3) we indicated with (t) the rate of growth generated by the
economy in the absence of monetary shocks; this rate isnot assumed
constant. Also, m is the rational expectation of rnformed in period
t -1on the basis of the information available at that time. The
objective functions (1) and (2) are in the information set of the
agents.The objective functions could have been written with an inflation
target instead of the money growth target, and the supply equation
could have been written as a function of unexpected inflation. This
alternative specification could have been closed by a simple money
demand equation such as
mt =Ut
+
•11
where 11 is the inflation rate and a is a constant. The shortcut adopted
here keeps the algebra simpler, saves degrees of freedom, and it should
not affect qualitatively the empirical results. The choice of a target
in terms of rate of growth of output instead of a level of GNP (or of
unemployment) is imposed by theoretical and empirical considerations.
If a target in level of output were chosen, one would have needed a more
complex dynamic structure for the supply equations, involving one or
more lags, for example. This procedure would have reduced the already
scarce degrees of freedom. Furthermore, the solution of the model and
the computation of the Nash equilibrium would have been much more
problematic and difficult to test empirically. This is an open question
to be addressed in future research
The targets on money growth and output growth are assumed identical
for the two parties: the difference in the objective functions is
constrained to be in the relative weights attributed to identical
targets. This restriction, imposed to conserve degrees of freedom,
should not affect the nature of the results. Finally, the targeted
level of money growth, 4'(t), is allowed to change over time, to reflect
velocity shifts in ('T).
(14)12
In this paper, no distinction is made between the "administration"
and the Central Bank. The implicit assumption, shared with most of the
literature on the PBC versus the PT, is that the administration has some
control over monetary policy, despite the relative independence of the
Central Bank. Weintraub (1978) argues that this is, in fact, a
realistic assumption. Stein (1985) provides several examples of cases
in which the Fed has accommodated the "desire" of the President. Grier
(1985) discusses and tests the degree of effective independence of the
Federal Reserve from both the Congress and the President. The degree cf
independence of the Federal Reserve from the administration is an
important and open question that would probably deserve a separate
treatment. Here it is assumed that the Federal Reserve cannot choose a
monetary pclicy independently from the administration.
As long as p > (t) and b and d are positive, both parties face the
problem of dynamic inconsistency of optimal monetary policy, as pointed
out originally by Kydland—Prescott (1977). If the targeted level of
output growth, ,ishigher than the growth rate generated by the
market, (t), the policymaker has an incentive to generate policy
surprises in order to approach the target. In fact, by substituting
(3) into (1) and (2), one gets:
zD = qt[±[mt
-(t)J2+[flt
-+ Y(mt-
m)]2]
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zR = qt[[mt
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It is more convenient to rewrite (5) and (6) as:13
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where b =5y2,d =ay2,and k(t) =- 7(t))/i.In order to identify
the problem of' dynamic inconsistency, consider, for example, party D
acting as "dictator," with no elections. If this party could make a
binding commitment it would choose to commit to the rule:
tnt ='pR) (9)
Thisrule is obtained by minimizing (5), taking account of' the
rationality of expectations, i.e., mt =m.However, binding
commitments are hardly available: the policymaker can always change
both its mind and the law. Then the time consistent rate of money
growth has to be found by minimizing (5) taking expectations as given.
This procedure leads to:
=
a b*(t) +
ab(m +k(t)J (10)
Solving for rational expectations, one gets:
=mt
=ip(t)+k(t) (11)114
In (11) the term b/a k(t) is the inflationary bias introduced into the
economy by the absence of binding commitments. Note that this bias
would be zero if and only if either b =0and/or 37(t) = (that is,
k(t) =0).The bias is higher the higher is the targeted rate of growth
of GNP relative to the rate of growth generated by the economy, and the
higher the weight attributed by the policymaker to the output target
relative to the money growth target. Note that, irrespective of the
level of the time-consistent rate of money growth, output growth is at
the level determined by the economy without policy intervention, because
money creation is perfectly anticipated. Furthermore, a fall in the
rate of growth of output generated by the market implies a higher rate
of inflation. In fact, a fall in 37(t) implies an increase in k(t). The
implication is that a negative trend of output growth could be
associated with an increasing trend of inflation, if the preferences of
the policymakers do not change.
Let us now consider the interaction of the two parties. It is
assumed that elections take place every two periods and are held at the
beginning of the period. After the elections of, say, time t, the
elected party chooses its policy for period t (i.e., mt). The electoral
outcomes are uncertain. Party D is elected with probability P and
party R with probability 1 —P.The probability P is taken as an
exogenous parameter and it is "common knowledge"; thus, it is in the
information set of agents. Alesina (1985b) shows how this assumption
could be generalized to the case of rational and forward—looking voters.
The crucial assumption is that, if voters are forward—looking (as they
should be!) and they know the objective functions of the two parties,
the policy chosen by the elected party at time t does not influence its15
chances of reelection at time t +2.In fact, the probability of
electing a party is a function of the expected future policies of the
two parties. If voters know the objective functions of the two parties,
they do not need the information of today's policy to form expectations
about tomorrow's policies.
If party D is elected, it minimizes (6). The first order condition
is:
=(1—g)p(t)g(m +k(t)) (12)
where g =b/(b+a).If party R is elected, it minimizes (7). The
corresponding first order condition is:
m =(1—h)p(t)+h[m
÷k(t)) (13)
where h =d/(c+d).Expectations are given by:
14= Pm÷(1—P)m if t is an election year; (111)
=m÷1 if party D is elected at time t;
rn!41 =m1 if party B is elected at time t.
Equation (110 underscores the idea that there is uncertainty in
expectation formation only in the first period of an administration.
The assumption that administrations last two periods implies for
the U.S. that a period is of two years. This assumption is consistent,
for example, with the existence of overlapping labor contracts of an
average length of two years (see Taylor, 1980, or Fischer, 1977). In16
more general terms, this assumption requires some form of stickiness in
the price system such that the economy does not adjust "too quickly" to
an unexpected monetary shock.8
For the empirical estimation of the model it is assumed that both
(t) and ip(t)arelinear trends:
iji(t) =ill+at (15)
(t) =— t (16)
The assumption that the optimal rate of money growth is not constant,
but increasing over time, captures the positive time trend in this
variable. Then, given (12), (13), (i'D, (15), and (16), some algebra
establishes that:
yDl =+ 1(1-P)1 - P)h
+1- P)h
(17)
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where k (t— S)/iand /y. The superscripts Dl ,D2,Hi ,andR2
stand for the first and second periods of D and H administrations.
Equations (17) to (211) embody several empirical implications:
1In the second half of both administrations there are no policy
surprises; therefore, output growth is at the level determined by the
market without policy intervention, S?— t.
2. If g > h there is a recession in the first half of an H
administration and an expansion above trend in the first half of a
D administration (equations (17) and (19)). The deviations of output
growth from trend, 7 —t,are bigger the more different are g and h,
i.e., the greater the difference in the relative weights attributed
by the two parties to the two targets.
3.Themore unexpected the electoral outcome, the bigger is the
deviation of output growth from trend. For example, if P is high and
party H is elected, the model predicts a deep recession. The reverse
holds if party D is elected and P is low. The more surprising is the
electoral result, the greater the discrepancy between the expected m
and its actual value.
1L If g > h the time consistent rate of money growth is higher for party
D than for party H in both periods (equations (21) to (211)).
5. If g > h ) 0, in a D administration the rate of money creation
deviates from trend more in the seoond period than in the first; the
opposite holds for the administrations of party H (equations (21) to
(211)).Ifh =0there are no deviations from trend in both periods
of a Republican administration. The intuition is that in a D
administration expectations are adjusted upward in the second period,18
when there is certainty that the more expansionary party is in
office. Therefore, the time consistent rate of money creation is
higher: the policyrnaker is forced to accommodate these expectations,
in order to avoid a recession. The opposite holds for the less
expansionary party. If ii =0,party R is not affected by the problem
of dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy, because this party would
have no incentive to generate policy surprises. In this ease the
optimal monetary policy is time—oonsistent for this party.
The outcome characterized by equations (17) to (21) is the one—
shot discretionary equilibrium without binding commitments. This
equilibrium could be improved upon if reputational strategies were
used in the repeated game. This issue is extensively explored by
Alesina (1985a). In this paper only the one—shot Nash case is
considered.
'I. Preliminary Evidence
This section shows that the qualitative empirical implications of
the model are consistent with U.S. data for the post—Second World War
period.
a. GNP Growth
Table 1 displays the average rate of growth of GNP at 1972 prices
per year for the first and second half of the administration of the two
parties. The averages are taken over the period 19'9—198'T, thus
including nine administrations.(21 Democratic and 5 Republican). In theTable 1
Average Rate of Growth of GNP
(Constant Prices)
1 9149—1 984
First Half Second Half
DemocraticAdministrations 5.0 3.9
RepublicanAdministrations 1.2 1.O
Source: Economic Report of the President (1985)
1920
second half of the administrations of both parties the average rate of
growth is almost identical, aroundpercent. The rate of growth in the
first half of Democratic administrations has been higher than in the
second half, while the rate of growth in the first half of Republican
administrations has been much lower than that of the second half.
An even more suggestive piece of evidence is presented in Tables 2
and 3. Table 2 shows the rate of growth of GNP for each year considered
in the sample. If one assumes that after a new administration takes
office there is a lag of a few months between the implementation of the
new policies and their full effect on GNP growth, then in the second
year, more than in the first, the results of the policies of the new
administration should become apparent. The difference in the
performance of the two types of administrations in the second year is
rather striking. The same observation is reinforced by Table 3 which
compares the rate of growth of the second year with the average rate of
growth of the third and fourth years. These tables are self—
explanatory. In the second years of all the Republican administrations
there has been a negative GNP growth. The only two other years of
negative growth in the period examined have been 1971 and 1980, both
years affected by the oil shocks (Table 2). On the contrary, the second
years of Democratic administrations show sustained growth well above the
second half of the term.
The following simple regression accounts for the preceding
observations. The average GNP growth per—year is regressed over the
four dummies for the four periods considered, first and second half of
Democratic administrations, first and second half of Republican
administrations, and a time trend. The variable Dl is a dummy assumingTable 2
Rate of Growth of GNP
(Constant Prices)
Democratic Administrations
Year
First Second Third Fourth
Truman
Kennedy
Johnson
Carter
0.5
2.6
6.0
5.5
8.7
5.8
6.0
5.0
8.3
11.0
2.7
2.8
3.7
5.3
—0.3
Average 3.7 6.1! 14.5 3.3
Average
First/SecondHalves 5.0 3.9
RepublicanAdministrations
Year
First Second Third Fourth
Eisenhower I
Eisenhower II
Nixon I
Nixon II
Reagan
3.8
1.8
2.8
5.8
2.5
—1.2
—0i
—0.2
—0.6
—2.1
6.7
6.0
3J4
—1.2
3.7
2.1
2.2
5.7
5i1
6.8
Average 3.3 —0.9 3.7 1.1
Average
First/SecondHalves 1.2 11.0
Source: See Table 1
*Oilshocks
21Table 3
Rate of Growth of GNF
(Constant Prices)
Second Year Average Third and Fourth Year
Truman 8.7 6.0
EisenhowerI -1.2 4.11
EisenhowerII -0.4 4.0
Kennedy 5.8 4.6
Johnson 6.0 3.6
Nixon I
Nixon II
Carter
—0.2
5.0
4.5
2.1:
1.2
Reagan I —2.1 5.2
Source: See Table 1
*Oilshocks
2223
the value of 1 in the first half of a Democratic administration and zero
otherwise, and Hi (R2) are dummies assuming the value of 1 in the first
(second) half of a Republican administration. The result is the
following (the t—statistics are in parentheses):
=4.116+1.05Dl —2.611Ri +0.29R2 —0.06 t (25)
(5.41)(1.17)(—3.10) (0.311)(—1 .05)
=0.65,D.W. =2.39
The coefficient on the second half Republican (R2) is clearly
insignificant, confirming that the data do not show any difference
between the second halves of both administrations. The dummy for the
first half of Republican administrations has, instead, a strongly
significant negative coefficient, as predicted by the theory. The dummy
for the first half of Democrat administrations (Di) has the right sign
even though is not statistically strongly significant. There is a
negative but not statistically significant trend.
Analogous results are obtained by the following additional test.
The quarterly GNP at constant 1972 prices has been regressed on eight
lagged values, a time trend, a dummy for the oil shocks, and two dummies
for the first half of the administrations of the two parties. In
Table 4 the results are displayed. The dummy REL assumes the value of 1
in the first eight quarters of each Republican administration and zero
otherwise. The coefficient of this variable is negative and significant
at the 1 percent level. The dummy DEL assumes the value of 1 in the
first eight quarters of each Democratic administration and zero
otherwise. The coefficient of this variable is positive as predicted byTable 14
Quarterly GNP
(1949—19814)
Variables Coefficients T—Statistics
C 13.50 1.1414
GNP(—1) 1.25 14.7
GNP(—2) —0.2 —1.145
GNP(—3) —0.16 —1.13
GNP(—14) —0.06 0.44
GNP(—5) —0.0014 —0.31
GNP(—6) 0.10 0.73
GNP(—7) —0.04 —0.29
GNP(—8) 0.007 0.08
TIME 0.23 1.29
OILSH —4.88 —1.61
REL —6.08 —2.79
DEL 2.21 0.96
D.W. =2.05,2= 0.99
Source: Citibank database
21425
the theory but it is not strongly significant. The variable OILSH
accounts for the effects of the two oil shocks.9
An additional important empirical observation along these lines is
shown in Table 5. This table displays the timing of the beginning of
all the recessions in relation to the preceding elections. A few months
after the election of every Republican administration a recession
started. There have been no recessions in the first half of a
Democratic administration. A recession started the same month of the
election of Truman in November 19118, and, therefore, two months before
this administration took office. The other two recessions started in
the second half of the Carter administration, at the time of the second
oil shock and in the last year of the second administration of
Eisenhower. Leaving aside the Truman recession, of dubious origin, five
of the seven recessions fit the theory and two do not. Note that the
two that do not fit also contradict the PBC approach because they occur
in the second halves of two administrations. The crucial fact that
discriminates in favor of the approach of this paper rather than the
PBC is that none of the Democratic administrations had recessions at the
beginning of their terms, as the PEC theory predicts.
b. Money Growth
The model implies that the time consistent rate of money creation
of Republican administrations is lower than that or Democratic
administrations, in both periods (first and second half). The following
regression allowing for a linear trend in money growth does not reject
this implication:Table 5
Post—Second World War Recessions
Through Beginning of Contraction
Previous Election
(Party Elected)
October, 1919 November, 19118 November, 19118
(D)
May, 19511 June, 1953 November, 1952
(R)
April, 1958 July, 1957 November, 1956
(R)
February, 1961 April, 1960 November, 1956
(R)
November, 1970 October, 1969 November, 1968
March, 1975 December, 1973
(R)
November, 1972
July, 1980 January, 1980
(R)
November, 1976
(D)
November, 1982 May, 1981 November, 1980
(R)
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research
*Oilshocks
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=1.149—1.111R +0.39t (26)
(2.18) (—1.83) (6.52)
=0.711, D.W. =1.96
m =averagerate of growth of Ml per year (biannual averages)
The dummy variable for Republican administrations, R, assumes the
value of 1 during Republican administrations and zero otherwise. The
coefficient of this varaible is negative, as predicted by the theory,
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. As expected there
is a highly significant trend. Beck (19810 pointed out that two
administrations do not quite fit the partisan theory of monetary policy:
the Kennedy administration and the first Nixon administration, beoause
of the tight monetary policy of the former and the 1971—1972 monetary
expansion of the latter. This is indeed the case. By introducing in
the regression (26) a dummy, KN, that assumes the value of —1 in the two
periods of the Kennedy administration and 1 in the second period of the
Nixon administration, one obtains:
=2.13—1.82R +2.03KN +0.37t (27)
(3.61)(—3.30) (3.00) (7.70)
=0.8J1,D.W. =2.56
The coefficient of H becomes bigger in absolute value and more
significant; the coefficient of KN is also very signifioant. Thus,
equation (27) identifies the two outliers of the regression (26).
The second empirical implication for money growth is that one
should observe a larger deviation from trend in the second halt of a
Democratic administration than in the first. In a Republican28
administration, instead, the opposite should hold if h > 0. The
following regression tests these implications:
mt =0.95+1.1802 —0.71Ri —0.36R2 +0.38t (28)
(1.19) (1.28) (—0.82) (—0.110) (6.311)
H2 =0.77,D.W. =1.81
02 is a dummy assuming the value of 1 in the second halves of Democratic
administrations and zero otherwise. As predicted by the theory, there
is more money creation in the second part of a Democratic administration
than in the first: the coefficient of 02 is in fact positive and large,
although statistically not strongly significant. For the Republican
administration the implications of the theory are rejected: the
relative magnitude of the two coefficients is opposite from what the
theory predicts and the two coefficients are not significant. The
reason for this imperfect fit is, again, to be attributed to the Kennedy
and first Nixon administrations. In fact, by introducing the dummy KN
into the preceding regression we obtain:
mt =1.58+1.1902 —1.20Ri —1.23R2 +2.0'lKN +0.37t (29)
(2.38) (1.66) (—1.71) (—1.611) (3.04) (7.77)
H20.81, D.W. =2.117
The fit of the regression greatly improves. There is virtually no
difference between the coefficients of Ri and H2. This result is
consistent with the prediction of the model for the case of h =0(see
equations (17) to (211)). Again, there is more money creation, on29
average, in the second half of Democratic administrations than in the
first.
Given that the model attributes so much emphasis to unexpected
monetary shocks, the unexpected money variable, 0MB, constructed by
Barro (1978) has been analyzed. This variable is obtained by Barro from
the residual of a regression of the rate of money growth, Ml
,onseveral
lagged variables assumed to be in the relevant information set of the
economic agents.10 Biannual averages of this variable (DMR) are
reported in Table 6 (this variable is not available after 1976).
Eleven observations have the expected sign, negative for Republican and
positive for Democratic administrations. Only three observations do not
fit. According to the following simple regression we can reject the
hypothesis of no significant difference in the "money surprises" under
the two types of administration:
DMRt =O.13—1.00R (30)
(1J11)(—2.'i7)
=0.75, D.W. =2.16
Table 5 does not suggest that "surprises" have occurred only in the
first half of the term in office. However, given the different approach
followed by Barro in modeling expectations, the data do not have to
conform necessarily to this pattern.
5. Estimation of the Model
The empirical evidence in the preceding section suggests that the
model is broadly in accordance with the data. In fact, the cross—Table 6
Barro's Unexpected Money
Biannual Averages
(Rate of Growth in Percent)
Truman 0.30
1.35
Eisenhower I —1.00
—0.20
Eisenhower II —0.85
—1.25
Kennedy —0.85
0.15
Johnson 0.35
1.30
Nixon 0.115
—0. L15
Nixon/Ford 0.25
—1 .145
Source: Barro (1978)
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equation restrictions imposed by the model cannot be rejected. The
system of equations (114) to (21) has been estamated using LSQ and
testing the nonlinear restrictions on the parameters imposed by the
theory. The only modification from equations (17) to (214) is given by
the introduction of a dummy variable in the output growth equation to
account for the two oil shocks.11
For reasons that will become immediately clear, two results of the
estimation are presented. Table 7 reports the results obtained by
estimating all the parameters of the model except k, fixed at the value
of 1 312 The log likelihood test does not reject the restrictions
imposed by the theory at the 5 percent confidence level.
The estimated values of the parameters are consistent with the
theory. In particular, h =312/(c+d)is insignificantly different
from zero, while g =£12/(a+b)is positive and significant (0.51).
Note that the regressions (28) and (29) were also consistent with the
assumption of h =0in the cost function of party H.The relative
magnitude of g and h does not reject the hypothesis that the Democratic
administrations have attributed more weight to the output target than
the Republican administrations, that instead have been concerned mainly
(or only, strictly speaking) with the money growth target. This is the
crucial result that discriminates the approach followed in this paper
from the PBC. The latter approach would predict that one should not
observe any difference between the behavior of the two administrations.
The estimated value of I (the effect of unanticipated money on
output growth) is rather high (3.08). This value is, however, not
inconsistent with the findings of Barro (1978). His results cannot be
directly compared with the results of this paper because of theTable 7
Estimation of the Model:
Parameters Estimates T—StatistiCs
V 14.26 8.147
3.08 1.91
P 0.71 5.62
g 0.51 1.85
h —0.09 —0.09
S O.004 0.29
a —0.03 —1.149
0.35 0.214
0 0.39 7.31
Log of likelihood function: —53.1
Degrees of freedom: 11
3233
different specification of the output equation, but the two estimates
have the same order of magnitude.13 The estimated values of I and ,
respectively3.08 and 11.26, and the value of k, fixed at 1.3, imply that
the targeted level of GNP growth (q) is about 8 peroent. This value is
reasonable given that it is a "bliss point" in the objective functions
of the two parties. The trend in output growth is negative but
insignificant, implying that the "natural" rate of GNP growth is around
11 percent per year.
The estimated value of P, the probability of electing a Democratic
administration, is high, 0.71, implying that Republican administrations
have always been elected with a certain amount of "surprise." The value
of this parameter is due to the fact that the deviation from trend of
output growth at the beginning of Republican administrations has been on
average bigger (in absolute value) than the same deviations at the
beginning of Democratic administrations. This observation was already
apparent from the result of the simple regressions (25) and (26) and
from Table 14In the simple model used this asymmetry can only be
captured by a high F, implying, oeteris paribus, more surprise when a
Republican president is elected, and, therefore, stronger effects on
output of monetary policy. However, the same phenomenon could be
explained by an asymmetric effect of negative versus positive monetary
shocks due, for example, to different degrees of price flexibility
upward or downward. The issue of the relation between poll predictions
about electoral outcomes and effects of policies needs further
investigation. Needless to say, the probability P is, in general,
different in every election.3J1
The remaining parameters have the expected signand order of
magnitude. In particular, there is a positiveand significant trend in
the money growth (a is positive and significant);the oil shocks have
affected negatively output growth in a significant way(the parameter a
is referred to the dummy variable for the oilshocks).
Let us now consider the results obtained byestimating all the
parameters, including k. The results are reportedin Table 8. The most
important difference in the two sets ofresults (Tables 7 and 8) is in
the value of I that is much higher and, probably,nrealistica1ly high
in the new estimations (4.97). Instead, the estimatedvalue of k is
much lower than 1.3, the value to which it wasfixed in the preceding
estimation. Furthermore, the t—statistics for Iand k are very low; on
the contrary, I was highly significant wherek was exogenously fixed
(Table 7). Note, also, that the value of the loglikelihood function is
virtually identical in the two regressions, implyingthat the log
likelihood test is also accepted at the 5 percent level.This result is
probably an indication of weak identificationfor the parameters I and
k. Consider, in fact, the output growth equations,here reproduced for
convenience:
=V+1(1-
1 -- Ph
+11 -I P)h
(31)
=— 1t (32)
RI —— + P(h—g)k + (h—1)t (33)
—y 1 —Pg
—(1—P)h 1 —Pg
—(1—P)h
y2
=7-1t
(3'41Table 8
Estimation of the Model: II
Parameters Estimates T—Statistics
1.26 10.01
.Y i497 0.98
P 0.81 5.13
g 0.90 6.08
h —1.6 —0.22
k 0.17 0.59
S —0.001 —0.32
a —1.29 —1.91
Th 0.58 0.68
0 0.39 7.56
Log of likelihood function: -52.1111
Degrees of freedom: 10
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In these equations the parameter k always enters multiplied by Y. The
parameter I also appears multiplied by ,butis insignificantly
different from zero. Therefore, the identification of I and k is left
exclusively to the money growth equation. Due to the lack of degrees of
freedom, this identification is probably weak.
6. Summary and Extensions
This paper has provided empirical support to the "partisan view" of
monetary policy. First of all, we could reject the hypothesis that
macroeconomic outcomes have been the same under Democratic and
Republication administrations in the post-Second World War period in the
U.S. We also could not reject the hypothesis that deviation of output
growth from trend occurred mostly in the first halves of the term, as
predicted by the theory; the rate of growth of money, instead, has been
systematically different for the entire term, also as predicted by the
theory. The conclusions that have been inferred from these results are
essentially two. In the first place, Democratic administrations seemed
relatively more concerned with an output target than with a money
growth/inflation target. Second, the real effects of new policies are
stronger in the first halves of new administrations. If a more
expansionary administration is elected, it can take advantage of a short
run Phillips curve. However, once the economy has fully adjusted to the
new regime, the same expansionary policy has little if any effect on
real variables, i.e., the Phillips curve is more (or completely)
vertical. Conversely, there are short run output losses when an
administration more concerned with inflation is elected. These results,37
then,reject Nordhaus' formulation of the "political businesscycle" and
support a partisan view of maoropolicy.
The analysis of this paper could be extended in severaldirections.
First, the dynamic structure of the model could be enriched,although
problems of degrees of freedom would arise. Second, attention could be
devoted to the issue of predictability of electoral results. Themodel
identifies a relation between degree or "surprise" in electoralresults
and real effects of monetary policy. This issue could be addressed
directly by using data on prediction polls. Third, systematic
difference in policies of the two parties could be analyzed bylooking
at different variables. For example, the stock market and the financial
markets may react to electoral results. Fourth, different countries
could be analyzed using the framework of this paper. Some complications
would arise for parliamentary systems in which the timing of elections
is an endogenous variable.38-
Footnotes
1. Nordhaus (1975) and McRae (1977) assume irrational votingbehavior
in the sense that voters can be systematically fooled by the
incumbent party. Rogoff—Sibert (1985) have obtained some results in
the same spirit as those of Nordhaus—Mcflae in a model with rational
but imperfectly informed voters. This point is also addressed by
Cukierman—Metzler (1985).
2. The empirical evidence presented by Nordhaus is rather weak for
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdon, Sweden, France, and Japan.
More favorable observations for the PBC were found in Germanyand
New Zealand, besides the U.S.
3.Thesame passage is quoted by Beck (198L0.
14 Beck (1982) also questions the magnitude of J-Jibbs' (1977) results;
nevertheless, the two authors agree on the qualitative featuresof
them.
5. Havrileski (1983) considers these effects on M2.
6. Important exceptions are McCallum (1978) and Havrileski (1985).
7. A notable exception is Abrams—Froyen—Waud (1983). These authors,
however, address issues related to budget deficits and their
response to economic conditions.
8. Barro (1978) finds that lagged values of unexpected monetary shocks
affect the current level of output.
9. This variable assumes the value of 1 in 197'—1975, and in 1980, zero
otherwise. The results of this regression are not sensitive to
alternative specifications of the dummy accounting for the oil
shocks.
10. These variables are lagged money growth, lagged unemployment,and a
measure of federal budget deficit (Barro, 1978, equation(1),
p. 551).
11. This variable takes the values of 1 in 1973-197', 1975—1976, and
1979—1980, zero otherwise.
12. The estimates are non—sensitive to small variations of this value.
13. Barro (1978) presents the following regression:
lg =2.95÷ 1.01 DMRt +1.21DMRt_1 +O.l'1DMRt...2 +0.26DMRt_3
(0.0'!) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.16)
+0.55MILt +0.03514t
(0.09) (0.00011)39
Standard errors are in parentheses. y =logof GrIP at 1972 prices;
DMR =unexpectedMl.tilL is the ratio of military personnel to the
male population aged 15 to 1414•14Q
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